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Abstract
State-of-the-art security mechanisms are often enforced in isolation from each other, which limits the kinds
of policies that can be enforced in distributed and heterogeneous settings. More speciﬁcally, it is hard to
enforce application-level policies that aﬀect, or use information from multiple distributed components. This
paper proposes the concept of a Security Service Bus (SSB), which is a dedicated communication channel
between the applications and the diﬀerent security mechanisms. The SSB treats the security mechanisms as
reusable, stand-alone security services that can be bound to the applications and it allows the enforcement
of advanced policies by providing uniform access to application-level information. This leads to a security
infrastructure that is more ﬂexible and more manageable and that can enforce more expressive policies.
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1 Introduction
Distributed applications consist of interacting components that are deployed on
various locations in the network. Nowadays, instead of being programmed from
scratch, applications are often built by composing heterogeneous, reusable compo-
nents. When security becomes a priority, several techniques exist to bind security
mechanisms to these components. For instance, security mechanisms can be sup-
ported by the middleware such as an application server or a virtual machine, they
can be injected in the code by security automata [20] or aspect-oriented program-
ming techniques [6], or they can simply be embedded in the code of the components.
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In either way, the distribution of the functional components implies that the security
mechanisms are spread throughout the infrastructure.
An important problem with the spreading of security mechanisms is that the
enforcement of application-level policies aﬀecting multiple locations (i.e. compo-
nents) becomes diﬃcult. Most mechanisms are not designed to support diﬀerent
locations – nor should they be – and while a number of speciﬁc technologies exist
that might solve this problem to some extent (e.g., security protocols, JACC [21]
or XACML [18]), they are by no means a complete solution. Extra infrastructural
support is needed to connect the diﬀerent, heterogeneous components and mecha-
nisms together in a uniﬁed way. This will increase the necessary level of control of
security policies in nowaday’s applications and the management thereof.
The main contribution of this paper is the discussion of the Security Service
Bus (SSB), a dedicated communication channel that interconnects the functional
components and security mechanisms within a certain trust domain. The SSB treats
security mechanisms as ﬁrst-class, reusable services that can use information from
components and that are bound to the components. The advantages of the SSB
are the potential to enforce a broader spectrum of security policies, the uniﬁed view
on the security infrastructure and the gained ﬂexibility and manageability. Remark
that this paper does not provide a concrete and ﬁnalized SSB solution. Rather, it
elaborates on the requirements, advantages and challenges of the SSB concept.
In Section 2, we illustrate the need for the SSB by means of a concrete example.
In Section 3, we discuss the SSB concept in more detail. Section 4 shows how to
the SSB facilitates the enforcement of the policies from Section 2 and points out
some other interesting applications of the SSB. Section 5 discusses related work and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
In this section, we discuss why the fact that security mechanisms operate in isolation
from each other limits the enforcement capabilities of the security infrastructure.
2.1 Example
Suppose we have an enterprise that oﬀers an online shopping application consisting
of three main components (see Figure 1). The web site that presents the shop to
the user is implemented in the Web Shop servlet component on a Java EE [22]
web container. This component interacts with the Shopping Cart Enterprise Java
Bean (EJB) which is deployed on an EJB container on another host and maintains
the items that the user is going to buy. The web shop and the EJB component
communicate with each other over the RMI/IIOP protocol [11]. The Shopping Cart
component in its turn requires a Payment component which is deployed on a third
host, but is implemented in the .NET framework. All communications between the
Shopping Cart and the payment component are realized over the SOAP protocol
[25].
The platforms that host each of these three components enforce a set of security
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Fig. 1. The example scenario consisting of three interoperating software systems.
mechanisms and policies at runtime. Typical examples of security mechanisms that
are enforced are user component-authentication, access control and auditing. Now,
consider the following policies:
(i) At the web shop, deny all access to customers that are registered as bad payers
at the Payment component.
(ii) At the host that runs the Payment component, ensure that the payment of a
user is equal to the amount in its shopping cart.
(iii) When an unauthorized user repeatedly tries to access the administrative inter-
face of the web shop, increase the level of auditing at all three sites.
The ﬁrst and second policies illustrate that a policy might need access to in-
formation that is not local to the enforcement point for that policy. In the ﬁrst
policy, the access control mechanism of the web container needs information from
the .NET component and in the second example, the access control mechanism of
the .NET environment needs information about the EJB component. The third
policy illustrates that security policies might aﬀect several distributed components:
the detection of an event at the web container triggers a change in the policies of
diﬀerent security mechanisms.
Without any further support, supporting policies like these is not straightfor-
ward. The ﬁrst and the second policies depend on information that is located in
other (remote) components. Some information about the caller (mainly its identity
and/or its credentials) is usually propagated over communication protocols such as
IIOP and SOAP, but evidently it is not feasible to propagate all kinds of informa-
tion the security mechanisms will ever need, especially when this is application-level
information that is not always known beforehand. One way of implementing these
policies without any further support is to make all the components interoperable
using a common protocol such as SOAP. Another approach is to let some com-
ponents be proxies for components they are connected to. For instance, the EJB
component could expose the bad payer attribute from the payment component to
the web shop. For supporting the third policy, the auditing policies of the diﬀerent
middleware platforms would need to be exposed to the web container and the audit
mechanism on the web container would need to be able to detect the attempted
access to the management interface.
Implementing these policies in an ad hoc way may work to some extent but
is far from optimal: dependencies on speciﬁc components need to be injected in
the code of the components or into the security mechanisms. It is clear that these
approaches are hard to manage and do not scale well if the information that is
required changes/grows and if the policies change.
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2.2 The Missing Link
The three policies from the previous section are hard to implement because they
require application-level information from several distributed components, and be-
cause the security mechanisms operate in isolation from other mechanisms and com-
ponents. This is especially hard when these components are heterogeneous. The
sketched solutions always require the introduction of some form of communication
channel between the security mechanisms on one hand and the functional compo-
nents on the other hand. Once such a channel is put in place, the example policies
can be supported much easier. The SSB precisely provides such an information
channel, and it does so in a generic way.
While there is no generic approach for sharing security information, some spe-
ciﬁc solutions and building blocks do exist. In the ﬁrst place, various dedicated and
low-level security protocols exist that serve speciﬁc purposes such as key distribu-
tion or mutual authentication. These protocols allow the communication between
two or more security mechanisms but they only focus on one speciﬁc security con-
cern. Secondly, the sharing of security information is supported to some extent
in the communication protocols that are used between the diﬀerent parts of a dis-
tributed application. Several middleware protocols such as IIOP and SOAP have
support for piggybacking security information to messages, for example in the form
of certiﬁcates or assertions. These protocols are usually generic and they can use
standardized representations such as WS-Security [17] and SAML [16], but they are
only building blocks in the sense that the applications and the security mechanisms
still have to agree upon which information should be propagated and under which
form. E.g., it is trivial to propagate the user’s role, but it is less straightforward to
determine the fact that precisely the role needs to be propagated.
The increased distribution of applications over the past decades is being followed
by an increased distribution and centralization of security mechanisms themselves.
Traditionally, security mechanisms have been tightly coupled with the applications
that need to be secured: applications either implemented the security mechanisms
themselves or they made use of software libraries that provide security mechanisms.
This monolithic design has evolved towards oﬀering the security mechanisms in the
middleware that connects the applications, such as virtual machines, object request
brokers and application servers. Typical examples of concrete middleware-level
security mechanisms are the CORBA Security Service [10] and implementations of
the Java EE security model. The inevitable and ongoing next step in the sharing of
security logic is to pull certain security mechanisms out of the middleware and to
oﬀer them as reusable services, that can be managed centrally and can be reused by
many heterogeneous components. This evolution can be seen by the appearance of
various security services such as Kerberos [15], Akenti [23], Tivoli Access Manager
[13] and Shibboleth [1] to name a few.
The use of centralized audit and authorization services in our example would
make supporting the required policies easier since we do not need to make the
platforms dependent on each other. However, if the number of components and
security services grows, the situation quickly becomes hard to manage and inﬂexible,
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because each of the security services has their own way of communicating with the
applications. The SSB aims at solving these issues by connecting the mechanisms
and the applications using an intermediary abstraction layer.
3 The Security Service Bus
We propose to interconnect the diﬀerent components and security mechanisms by
means of a dedicated communication channel for security-relevant information such
as security policies, security-relevant events and contextual information. In this
section, we elaborate on this approach which we call the Security Service Bus.
First, we discuss the most important requirements. Subsequently, we present the
core concepts and components of the SSB and discuss their goal. Finally, we explore
which kinds of security information can be exchanged on the SSB.
3.1 Requirements
The SSB is a dedicated communication channel that interconnects the diﬀerent
components of a distributed application and the security services. In order to guar-
antee the beneﬁts of this approach, the following requirements need to be taken into
account.
Flexibility Since the SSB needs to provide a more ﬂexible security infrastructure,
it must be ﬂexible as a platform itself.
Security Besides giving increased ﬂexibility, the SSB can also make the environ-
ment more secure, because there is a dedicated channel for sensitive security
traﬃc. However, if the SSB is compromised, the consequences can be disastrous.
Every single security service an application would be exposed to the attacker.
Therefore, it is extremely important that the bus itself is highly secured.
Performance The more information security mechanisms can use, the larger the
performance overhead can become, especially when the information is distributed.
Because security mechanisms often block functional components (e.g. while mak-
ing an authorization decision), the introduction of the SSB can have far-reaching
performance consequences. Therefore it is important to keep the performance
overhead under control. In a second step, the SSB can also be used to make the
security infrastructure more eﬃcient.
3.2 Conceptual Overview
The SSB is a dedicated security-speciﬁc communication channel that lets the com-
ponents and the security mechanisms exchange information with each other. Based
upon this communication channel, the SSB brings the established principle of sep-
arating functional logic and security logic to a distributed setting. It does so by
virtualizing the security infrastructure as a set of interoperating components and
security services that can be accessed, managed and bound to each other in a uni-
form way. Each component in a distributed infrastructure that needs to be secured
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Fig. 2. Application bindings and security services.
and each security mechanism that provides security logic is connected and deployed
on the SSB together with an exact speciﬁcation of what the application or security
service requires and provides in terms of security information and security logic.
We assume that the SSB is deployed within a single trust boundary.
Security Services
The SSB treats security mechanisms as ﬁrst-class reusable services that can be
invoked, managed and composed with applications and with each other. The se-
curity services do not have to be completely independent components, they can
also belong to existing middleware platforms. Security services are the components
that contain the security logic and they implement a security interface and a man-
agement interface (see Figure 2). The security interface speciﬁes the core security
functionality. For instance, for an audit service, the security interface contains oper-
ations for auditing events and for an authorization service, it contains operations for
making authorization decisions given certain contextual information. The manage-
ment interface speciﬁes operations that can be invoked to conﬁgure an manage the
security service, such as loading a certain policy or enabling/disabling the service.
The SSB keeps track of all security services that are registered and can it invoke
their functionality when it is needed. The security services themselves can use the
SSB for obtaining application-level information.
Application Bindings
Applications are bound to the SSB by means of an application binding. This is
a wrapper component that presents an abstract view on an application to the SSB.
The SSB aggregates all these views on the applications and provides a uniform
abstraction layer to the security services that is independent of all application-
speciﬁc details and that contains all application-level information available. When a
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security service needs a particular piece of information, the SSBmediates the request
and ensures that the application binding that oﬀers the information is queried. The
model that is used to specify the interfaces of the application binding consists of:
(i) A set of subjects S and subject attributes SA. Subjects represent the active
entities in the application, typically the users.
(ii) A set of resources R and resource attributes RA. Resources represent the assets
of the application that need to be protected. We assume that resources are
organized hierarchically.
(iii) A set of actions A and action attributes AA. Actions represent the operations
that can be executed on the resources. Each action is associated with one
resource and one resource has many actions.
(iv) Three binary relations “.” that associate subjects, actions and resources from
S, A and R with their attributes from SA, AA and RA respectively.
The application binding implements of an enforcement interface and an informa-
tion interface. The enforcement interface speciﬁes all resources that are contained
in the application and lists all the actions that can be performed on these resources.
Resources and actions can correspond directly to low level concepts in the imple-
mentation of the application (such as a class and its methods), but they can also
represent more abstract entities. The application binding guarantees that the be-
havior of the security services can be invoked each time an action on a resource is
called. The security services can then use the SSB for obtaining information about
the subject that wants to execute the action, the action itself and the resource on
which the action is executed.
The information interface speciﬁes which attributes about the subjects and re-
sources of the application are made available to the SSB. Besides using information
about a local invocation of an action, security services can make use of the in-
formation of other application bindings for obtaining additional information. The
information interface consists of S, SA, R, RA and their association relations and of
the hierarchy of R. In this case, the subjects do not only represent active subjects,
but rather group all static and dynamic information an application has about a cer-
tain user, for instance, a user’s age or telephone number. R represents all resources
the application exposes such as an account or a form. The information that can be
represented in the information interface either belongs to subjects or to resources.
For some kinds of information it is possible to model it as a subject attribute or as
a resource because it relates to both. For instance, a particular users’ account at
the payment component can be an attribute of the a subject or it can be a resource
with the subject’s name as an attribute.
A particular deployment conﬁguration of the security bus will consist of a num-
ber of security services, a number of applications and a number of application bind-
ings. One of the big advantages of the explicit notion of application bindings is that
the correctness of the conﬁguration can be veriﬁed by checking whether the appli-
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cation bindings match the policies of the security services in terms of attributes and
operations they must provide. In that sense, the main challenge in (re)conﬁguration
is to maintain this condition as an invariant.
3.3 Classiﬁcation of Security Information
The deﬁnition of the security bus is intentionally kept rather broad. This section
explores the possible kinds of security-related information that can be shared on
the SSB. Three main categories of security information are distinguished.
Policies
Most security services are conﬁgured by a declarative policy that speciﬁes the
expected behavior of the service. Security policies are used to make easy adapta-
tions to the behavior of the security service due to changing security requirements.
Administrators of the SSB can change or query policies over the management in-
terfaces of the security services, but security services can also transfer the policies
themselves. For instance, an authorization service can reason about its policy and
send an optimized sub-policy to another authorization service for performance rea-
sons. Two major kinds of security policies are distinguished:
• Conﬁguration policies specify various conﬁguration parameters of a security ser-
vice such as the location of an LDAP server, the use of speciﬁc keys or initializa-
tion vectors, or the kind of authentication mechanism that has to be used.
• Security Policies are speciﬁc to a security mechanism and are written in a lan-
guage that is based on a particular security model such as RBAC [7]. These
kinds of policies are more abstract than conﬁguration policies. Typical exam-
ples of high-level security policies are access control policies, username-password
mappings and role assignment policies.
Events
In the context of security information, events are things that happen in a system
that are relevant for security. Often, an event is a trigger of security logic. Usually,
an event is triggered by the invocation of an operation or the sending of a message.
Security events are found at two levels:
• Security-speciﬁc events are events that are generated by security services them-
selves. Examples are authentication decisions or authorization decisions.
• Security-relevant events In most cases, security logic is initially triggered by an
application-speciﬁc event. An application-speciﬁc event is an event about an
application- or platform-level abstraction. An example of a generic security event
is the invocation of an operation.
Contextual Information
This is application-level information that is used in various security policies.
This information is represented in the form of attributes and can relate to subjects
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or resources. Attributes can be application-speciﬁc, such as the bad payer attribute
in the example, or they can be security-speciﬁc, such as the credentials or the role
of a user.
4 Application of the SSB
In this Section, we show how the SSB can be used to enforce the concrete policies
from Section 2.1 and we show how the SSB facilitates solving some more advanced
scenarios.
Figure 3 illustrates how the SSB can be used to support the policies from the
example in Section 2.1. The three components are now bound to the SSB. The
interfaces of the application bindings are shown in Table 1. Because attribute
mappings and resource-action mappings are trivial, they are omitted. Attribute
values are not shown either. The enforcement interface of the web container lets
security services intercept HTTP messages and the enforcement interfaces of the
EJB container and of the .NET runtime can intercept method calls. The bindings
are responsible for translating application state to the enforcement and information
interfaces.
The audit and access control mechanisms from the three middleware platforms
have been replaced by two security services, of which the security interfaces are
shown in Table 2. Each of the middleware platforms now write their audit records
to the audit service and query the authorization service for authorization decisions.
The authorization and audit services now hold a policy that states which operations
are permitted or audited respectively. These policies are expressed in terms of
actions of the enforcement interfaces. When a user invokes an action on a protected
resource (directly or indirectly) at one of the components, the middleware platforms
notify the SSB of this event. The SSB then notiﬁes each security service that
needs to know this event, in our case both of the security services. 4 When the
authorization service needs to make a decision for the ﬁrst and second policies, it
queries the information interfaces of the other applications via the SSB in order
to obtain the badpayer attribute from the Payment component and the totalprice
attribute from the cart of the active subject. If an authorization decision is made,
it is returned to the application binding and another event is placed on the SSB.
The audit service inspects the authorization decision events and when it detects a
repeated denial event for the management interface of the Web Shop component, it
raises makes its audit policy more strict.
This example only illustrates the basic functionality of the SSB but once the SSB
is put in place, more advanced scenarios can be supported. For instance, the SSB
can oﬀer a session management service that allows diﬀerent applications to share
4 While it is true that this would generate an enormous amount of events, we stress that this discussion is
held at the conceptual level. An implementation of the SSB can realize the same overall eﬀect much more
eﬃciently.
T. Goovaerts et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 31–43 39
I EI EI E
M SM S
Security Service Bus
Authorizati
on Service
Web
Container
EJB
Container .NET CLR
Web 
Shop
Shoppi
ng Cart 
EJB
Payme
nt
Assem
-bly
RMI/IIOP SOAP
user
Audit 
Service
Application Binding Application Binding Application Binding
Fig. 3. The Example Revisited.
Table 1
The Application Bindings for the Example.
Information Interface Enforcement Interface
Web
Shop
S = {alice, bob}
SA = {certa, certb}
R = {webshop, adminintf}
S = {alice, bob}
SA = {certa, certb}
R = {webshop, adminintf}
A = {post, get}
Shopping
Cart
S = {alice, bob}
SA =
{nbitems, totalprice, role}
R = {carta, cartb}
S = {alice, bob}
SA =
{nbitems, totalprice, role}
R = {carta, cartb}
A = {add, remove, checkOut}
Payment
Com-
ponent
S = {alice, bob}
SA = {badpayer}
R = {accounta, accountb}
RA = {balance}
S = {alice, bob}
SA = {badpayer}
R = {accounta, accountb}
RA = {balance}
A = {pay}
Table 2
The Security Interfaces for the Example.
Audit Service audit(Event event)
Authorization Service bool isAuthorized(Subject s, Action a, Resource r)
a common security context which can hold, for example, information about the
usage history of a principal. Another application is policy distribution: a centrally
speciﬁed policy can be decomposed and distributed to decision points that are nearer
to the resources that need to be protected.
An important assumption in the preceding discussion of the SSB is that it is
deployed within a single trust domain: all components in the example reside in
the same company or division and the security requirements originate from a single
authority. Relaxing this assumption complicates the SSB, but also reveals some
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interesting problems that can be tackled more easily when a SSB is provided. Sup-
pose that we have a single security domain consisting of many subdomains. In such
a case, the ﬂow of security information needs to be controlled very tightly. Guaran-
teeing this without an SSB would be very cumbersome. However, when applications
within these domains would be connected by a SSB, they could explicitly advertise
the information ﬂow policies and rely on the SSB for enforcing them in a uniform
way.
5 Related Work
We are not aware of any work that proposes to use a global platform for security
services. However, research does exist that links various security services to each
other. Foley [8] introduces a framework that allows the sharing of access control
policies between diﬀerent middleware platforms. All policies can be encoded in a
format that is based on Keynote credentials. The framework supports conﬁgura-
tion, comprehension, migration, maintenance and decentralization. McDaniel [14]
proposes a ﬂexible security enforcement architecture for a group communication
system called Antigone. The architecture enforces low level session policies that
specify the security properties of a group session. Flexibility is achieved by using
an event bus for communication between the API and the security mechanisms.
Several authors have explored the enforcement of advanced security policies that
can take into account more information than the typical user/action/resource at-
tributes. For instance, the dimension of time can be included and decisions can be
made depending on previous events [20,2] or future events [12,9]. In the ﬁeld of
access control, several authors have proposed ways of representing, using and ob-
taining application-level information for use in access control policies [3,24]. These
advanced policy enforcement mechanisms work well in local and homogeneous en-
vironments, but because of the lack of a uniform communication channel, it is hard
to apply them in a distributed and heterogeneous setting. The work that perhaps
comes closest to the SSB is Tivoli Access Manager [13], but this approach only
considers access control and as such it does not address the problem of generically
binding the applications with security services.
The security mechanisms within some platforms are architected with ﬂexibility
in mind in the sense that third parties can develop pluggable modules that extend
the security functionality. For instance, the Java Authentication and Authorization
Service (JAAS) [4] and the Java Authorization Contract for Containers (JACC) [21]
allow customization with new authentication mechanisms and authorization engines
respectively. The SSB can be seen as a generalization of these approaches that is
inherently distributed.
Existing ways of sharing security information are mostly found in middleware
protocols such as IIOP, .NET Remoting or SOAP. When propagation at the protocol-
level is not possible, alternative solutions are needed. In the literature, diﬀerent
approaches exist for attaching security metadata to an execution context at a lower
level than the protocols. Stateful Distributed Interposition (SDI) [19] and Cause-
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way [5] provide system-level architectures for automatically propagating metadata
between diﬀerent distributed processes. These systems use an instrumented ker-
nel and copy metadata at transfer points in the call ﬂow of the application. The
diﬀerence with our work is that we envision a more generic form of information
sharing: instead of only pushing security attributes along with the application ﬂow,
like these systems do, the SSB supports more types of information and is based on
a pull model where the security services request the information themselves. How-
ever, these systems can be useful instruments for implementing certain parts of a
SSB, especially keeping track of sessions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have motivated the Security Bus concept as a way of interconnecting
security services and we have illustrated how to apply this idea to the enforcement
of a set of policies that span multiple distributed applications. This work discusses
the general concept of an SSB rather than a fully worked-out architecture. We
are currently designing the ﬁrst version of our architecture in detail and we aim to
validate it in a prototype.
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